

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

CORN BILL.—I have before me the Report of the Committee of the House of Lords, on the subject of the Corn Bill.—The manifest object of the "*inquiry*" of this Committee is to lay the ground for a Bill to prohibit the importation of corn, until our own corn will sell at such a price as shall enable the grower to grow it, and to pay his rent and taxes.—As it is my opinion, that a Bill of this sort will be again brought forward, I shall, before hand, put in my protest against any such measure.—I have several objections to it; and, that I may have the better chance of being understood, I shall state and explain, as clearly as I am able, the grounds on which they rest, under distinct heads.—I must first, however, premise, that I do not see any *injustice*, towards the rest of the community, in the passing of such a Bill as was proposed last year. I dislike such a Bill, because it would be injurious to the country at large; because it would do general harm; and not because it would benefit the farmer at the expence of the community.—The state in which this country now is, is a very singular and critical state. A long and expensive war has created taxes enormous. These taxes (to say nothing of those necessary for the new war with America) must be kept on, or it will be impossible for the Government to pay the interest of the National Debt. To pay these taxes, and the poor rates, which latter alone amount to nearly half as much as the whole revenue of France, prices must be, on an average of years, kept up to nearly the point of the last five or six years. To keep up prices to this point the products of the earth in other countries must be excluded, and especially the products of France, lying so near to us, and now become infinitely more rich in agricultural productions than at any former period.—France, in consequence of her happy Revolution, seems to have become a new country. She has now an abundance of all the necessities of life, and her superabundance she is selling to us. There is annually a

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great fair for neat cattle at *Barnet* in Hertfordshire. Hither are brought the cattle from Scotland, Wales, Devonshire, and elsewhere, to be distributed amongst the numerous graziers and stall-feeders of the southern and eastern counties of England. When exhibited at this fair, the cattle cover a space of ground about *two miles in circumference*. Now, I have no scruple in saying, that I am fully convinced, from my own observation, and from information gathered nearly upon the spot, that the French have, since the month of May last, brought to, and sold in this country, a *far greater number of neat cattle than are brought, in any one year, to this great national fair*.—Let any one estimate the effect of such an importation. The effect really has been the lowering of the value of every man's neat stock *above one third*.—France, therefore, freed from the feudal system, freed from the dronery of the monasteries, freed from tythes, possessing a happier climate, and paying lower wages for labour, can, does, and will undersell the grower of corn and breeder of cattle in England. Besides the neat cattle above-mentioned, the French have brought, and are daily bringing, great numbers of swine, fat as well as lean; of sheep, fat and lean, and the fat, of surprising fatness; of poultry, of all sorts, of the finest quality; of butter, eggs, fruit, and even garden vegetables.—It would really seem, that two or three new counties of England had risen out of the sea, teeming with food, without having any one to eat it.—The effect of this must be, it has been, it is, and it will be, the lowering, and the keeping down of, the price of these articles in England, Ireland, and Scotland. For, though these products arrive on the coast, they have their effect all over the kingdom. They swell the general quantity, in the same way, and with as perfect regularity, as your hand, put in on one side of a bucket of water, makes the water rise in every part of the bucket.—Therefore, if you pass a law to "*protect the farmer*," as it is called, against the importation of corn, why not include cattle, sheep, and hogs, which form nearly one half of his

property, and which are as necessary as bread?—My objections to such a law are 1st, that, *it being a benefit to mankind in general, that countries should be at liberty to supply each other with their products, such a law would be hostile to that great and beneficent principle.*—Why should such a war be made against nature; against the *universal good of man*? Why should we, who live in a less happy climate, and who labour under many disadvantages, unknown to our neighbours; why should we not participate of their superabundance? Here is a person of fixed income in England. Why should he not eat the cheap beef, mutton, and pork, raised by his neighbour in Normandy?—“*Why!*” exclaims the farmer and landlord: “*Why!* why, because we are compelled to pay as much tax and poor-rate as if none of this supply came from France to supplant ours in the market. Take off the taxes created by the war; take off the poor-rates, created by the war; take off these, place us where we were in 1792, and we shall be able to supply you at as cheap a rate as the French can.”—In answer to this, I have to observe, in the first place, that, if there be any fault in the creation of the taxes, who is more to blame than the *farmers and landlords*? Did they, in any one instance, *oppose the war*? On the contrary, did they not *address the King* to undertake it and carry it on? Did they not, in all parts of the country, pledge their *lives and fortunes* for the carrying on of the war? Did they not say, that they were ready to spend their last shilling, and the last drop of their blood, in the cause of Kingly Government against Republicanism? And, did they not, by voluntarily arming themselves as *Yeoman Cavalry*, actually support, physically support, the war-party, against all the remonstrances and attempts of the opponents of the war? Were these professions insincere? If they were, those who made them deserve no pity; and, if they were sincere, ought they to grumble and growl at the loss, which they are now sustaining, seeing that the object of all their prayers is attained; namely, the fall of Republicanism, and the re-establishment of Monarchy in France? The debt, which now swallows up more than half of the taxes, arose necessarily out of the war; the expence of the new war in America have a like source; the poor-rates is attributable to the war. And, as the far-

mers and landholders were amongst the forwardest in support of the war, must they not be unreasonable indeed to object to pay their share of those taxes? Yes, they are, indeed, willing to pay their share of the taxes; but they wish to have such *high prices* as will enable them to do this without any distress, any loss, any falling off in their flourishing state. But, gentlemen, this is unreasonable. You have had what you wished for. You have destroyed Republicanism in France, and are now giving a drubbing to the Yankees; and, will you not *pay* for this? Do you think, that the soldiers and sailors, and contractors and paymasters, and barrack-people, and pursers and purveyors, are not to be *paid* for gratifying you? You huzza at the grant of an immense sum to Lord Wellington; you almost kiss the shoes of the gallant Duke; you are ready to cram your fists down the throats of those who do not feel disposed to bawl as loud as yourselves. *Grant!* yes, gentlemen; but what is the *grant* without the *money*? A grant does not mean *words*. Palaces and splendid equipages, and pleasure grounds and ample domains, are not made of *parchment*. It is *money*; money, good gentlemen, that the grant means; whence, then, is the money to come but out of the taxes? whence are the taxes to come but, in part, at least, out of your pockets? And, as it is in the nature of taxes to produce poverty and misery, what right have *you*, above all men living, to complain of bearing your share of that poverty and misery?—You appear to have thought, that the taxes you were paying would support a war, which would so completely ruin the people of France, that they would not recover in a century, or, at least, before we should be at them again with another war; and you were exceedingly gratified at being told, that Napoleon had left nothing but old *crippled men, women and children*, to till the land. How surprised you must have been to see the wheat, barley, oats, neat cattle, sheep, hogs, and poultry of France come crowding upon our shores, the moment that peace was made. These old cripples, and the women and children of Napoleon, must have been very busy in the fields! The truth is, that, while England, by that war against the Republicans of France, which you were so eager to support, has been loading herself with unredemable debts, and unbearable taxes, the people of France have been tilling and enriching their country; they have been



multiplying its means of increasing population; they have been freeing it from those restraints, those bars to agricultural improvement, which before kept them poor and miserable amidst the richest gifts of nature. You have been, for years, amused with lies, which your evil passions, your hatred and envy, led you to believe; and you now find the sorrowful truth forced upon you in a way that makes you *feel* as well as *hear*; and, which is not the least galling part of the change, you find your own countrymen, who joined you in hallooing for the war; you find the colonels and captains, and barrack-masters and pursers, all exclaiming against you, because you want to sell them a loaf at a shilling, when they can get it from the people of France at ninepence, notwithstanding Napoleon left none but old crippled men, women and children, to till the land!—There is in our statute book a law, punishing with *death*, and death too, of the most horrible kind, any man who should send from this country even a *bushel of potatoes* to France, when the people of that country were thought to be in a state of *famine*. This law was passed at the outset of the war against the Republicans of France. They were not starved. They set themselves to break up the parks, to turn the monasteries into farm-buildings, to make the drones labour for their bread. The result is, that they have enough to *spare* to reduce our prices one third; and you have the mortification to find, that those who have become captains by the war, prefer the French cheap loaf to the English dear loaf.—One of the charges against Napoleon was, that he had *ruined agriculture*; that he had left the farmer *no market* for his produce. It seemed odd, indeed, that the farmer should be at a *loss for a market* for what the *old crippled men, women and children*, were able to raise. But this was the assertion; and he was cursed, through all our edifying prints, for this his tyranny. Well! He is put down. The French farmer has a *market* in England; and the moment he sends his produce to it, that moment would you pass a *law to stop him*. Yes, you would have a law passed to deprive the French farmer of that very market, for having deprived him of which you so heartily cursed Napoleon! You would have a law passed for the purpose of making the French farmer endure, during peace, that very evil, which you abused Napoleon for causing him to endure, dur-

ing war!—With reflections like these in my mind, it is impossible that I can pity (I speak *generally*, of course,) the farmers or the landlords. But it is certain, that they cannot grow wheat, with the present taxes, so cheap as the French, who pay so little tax and no tythe, can send it hither; and that, unless the French be prohibited from sending their products hither, many of our farmers must be *ruined*.—*Eh bien!* And what then! They endeavoured to ruin the people of France. *Ruin*, however is a word of indefinite meaning. A man calls himself *ruined*, if he cannot ride as fine a horse as he has been used to ride. The truth is, that, if no law of prohibition be passed, agriculture in England (if the present taxes continue) must, in some measure, decline; part of our food will be raised in France, now freed from feudal shackles and tythes; part of the capital now employed in farming will be withdrawn from it; part of those who now till the land will be driven to other occupations. And where is the *harm* of all this? Is it for this reason that the fertile fields of France are to be closed against us? What! are the big-bellied, bluff-cheeked, port-guzzling, loud-talking farmers of England, whose daughters play upon the piano, to be *ruined* by the sale of the produce, raised by the *old crippled men, the women and children* of France!—We know that, before the Revolution, a principal article of food, in France, was the *frog*. In our favourite national song, "*Oh, the Roast Beef of Old England*," the air of which, on the drum and fife, we hear, in our streets, calling our sons of Mars to their dinners, it is said, that the "*shirtless Frenchman, meagre, pale and lean*," lives upon "*soup meagre, frogs, and sallad*." How, then, must this Revolution, which, we are told, "*humanity ought to deplore*," have changed things in France, since you, the farmers and landlords of England, want a law passed to prevent the French from sending their *spare* not *frogs* and *sallad*; but their *spare bread*; and when these frog-eating people do actually send us, not only a great deal of bread, but thousands upon thousands of milch cows, heifers, oxen, fat hogs, fat sheep, and poultry, and eggs and butter in prodigious quantities. How must this Revolution have changed things in France!—But, if the farmers in England be ruined, and the landlords be obliged to lower their

rents one half, *how are the taxes to be paid?* That is a question, with which I never embarrass myself. I never ask how they can be paid, or how they can be dispensed with. It is for those who halloo for the war against the French, and who now halloo for the war against the Americans, to discuss those interesting questions. The war has been, and is, the cause, and the sole cause, of the taxes; and, therefore, to halloo for the war was to justify, and call for, additional taxation. So that it is beyond all measure stupid as well as base in those who halloo for war to complain that they have the expences of it to pay.—A free intercourse between nations is a right of human nature. I disapprove of imposts upon wine, oil, sugar, and every thing else; and though I am aware, that it would be no more unjust towards the manufacturer of cloth to permit French cloth to be imported duty free, than it is unjust towards the manufacturer of corn to permit French corn to be imported duty free, it does not follow, that, because the entry of cloth is prohibited, I must agree in the propriety of prohibiting corn. I am glad, that, at least, there are *some* articles, in which the trade is free; and, especially, as the wide difference in the prices of these articles compared with those of our own, must necessarily give rise to reflections, which may finally lead to those inquiries, as to the real causes of this difference, which inquiries may do a great deal towards producing an event, so much to be desired by every well-wisher to the cause of freedom.—It is very certain, that the Government is in a dilemma upon this subject of the Corn Bill, which, if I mistake not, must, if passed with effect, become a *Cattle Bill* too. If the Government bring in such a Bill, the Captain and Barrack-master will complain, that they are thereby compelled to buy their bread dearer from the English farmer than they could get it from the French farmer; and if no such Bill be brought in, these gentlemen may begin to complain, that proper means are not adopted to raise taxes, out of which is to come their half-pay. The dilemma is a pinching one, I must confess; but I must leave the partisans of the war, the most prominent of whom are the farmers and landlords, to get out of it as well as they can. I have, indeed, heard of a scheme, which I will just mention, though I, by no means, give it as feasible, or as

having my approbation. It is this: to apply to the farmers of France, who have but little Government tax to pay, and who have *no poor-rates* nor any *tythes* to pay, to make, annually, a collection amongst themselves, and send it over to be distributed amongst the farmers of England. At the first blush, indeed, it does appear reasonable, that those who have the *profit* of agriculture should bear a part, at least, of its burdens. But this scheme is impracticable; and, therefore, I must, as I said before, leave the remedy wholly to the *partisans of the war*, past as well as present.—Of all the motives to intercourse between nations no one is so powerful as the want, on the one part, of the *necessaries of life*, of which, on the other, there is a superabundance. Our intercourse with the baker and butcher is much more constant, and of greater importance, than that with the carpenter or mason. We are better acquainted with their persons, their manners, their character, and with the immediate causes of their prosperity or decline. So it is between nations; and, as I am thoroughly convinced, that it would be of the utmost importance to this country to make its people well acquainted with the state of France, and with those causes which have led to that state of prosperity and abundance, which enable her farmers to come here *in person*, and undersell ours in our own markets and fairs, I do most anxiously hope, that no measure will be adopted to put a stop to, or to restrain, in the smallest degree, this amiable and promising intercourse.—I must defer, till a future number, my other objections to *any law*, tending to prohibit, or restrain, the importation of the products of the earth from any foreign country, and especially from France.

AMERICAN WAR.—The following account of a battle, and of a *victory* on our part, gained over the Americans, is, perhaps, the most curious of any that ever was published, even in this enlightened, Lancaster-school country.—Before I insert it, let me observe, that the scene of action lies in the *heart of Canada*, though, from the accounts that we have had, any one, not armed against the system of deception that prevails here, must have supposed, that there was not a single American remaining in Canada.—The *victory* in question is said to have been gained near the famous Falls of Niagara; and, we shall now see

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what sort of victory it was, according to the account of the Commander himself, and which account will become a subject of remark, after I have inserted it.

Head-quarters, Falls of Niagara,
25th July, 1814.

DISTRICT GENERAL ORDER.

Lieutenant-General Drummond offers his sincerest and warmest thanks to the troops and militia engaged yesterday, for their exemplary steadiness, gallantry, and discipline in repulsing all the efforts of a numerous and determined enemy to carry the position of Lundy's-lane, near the Falls of Niagara: their exertions have been crowned with complete success, by the defeat of the enemy and his retreat to the position of Chippawa, with the loss of two of his guns and an immense number of killed and wounded, and several hundred prisoners. When all have behaved nobly it is unnecessary to hold no particular instances of merit in corps or individuals.—The Lieutenant-General cannot, however, refrain from expressing, in the strongest manner, his admiration of the gallantry and steadiness of the 89th regiment, under Lieut. Colonel Morrison, and Major Clifford, who ably and gallantly supplied the Lieutenant Colonel's place after he was wounded; 41st light company, under Capt. Glew, and detachment of the 8th, or King's, regiment, under Captain Campbell; and Royals acting with them; also a party of incorporated militia, by whom the brunt of the action was for a considerable time sustained, and whose loss has been severe. To the advance under Lieut.-Colonel Pearson, consisting of the Glengary light infantry, under Lieut.-Colonel Bottersby; a small party of the 104th, under Lieut.-Colonel Drummond; the incorporated militia under Lieut.-Colonel Robinson, and detachments from the 1st, 2d, 4th, and 5th Lincoln militia, and 2d York, under Lieut.-Colonel Pary, 103d; the Lieutenant-General offers his warmest thanks. They are also due to the troops which arrived under Colonel Scott during the action, viz. the 1st, or Royal Scots, under Lieut.-Colonel Gordon; 8th, or King's, under Major Evans; 103d regiment under Colonel Scott; flank company 104th, with the Norfolk, Oxford, Kent, and Essex rangers, and Middlesex, under Lieut.-Colonel Hamilton.—The admirable steadiness and good conduct of the 19th Light Dragoons under Major Lisle, and of the detachment of Royal Artillery under Captain Maclachlan, are entitled to

particular praise: the latter officer having been badly wounded, the command of the artillery devolved to Captain Mackonochie, with whose gallantry and exertions Lieutenant-General Drummond was highly pleased. Serjeant Austin, who directed the firing of the Congreve rockets, deserves very great credit. To the officers of the General and of his personal Staff, to Captain Holland, Aide-de Camp to Major-Gen. Riall, Lieut.-Gen. Drummond feels himself greatly indebted for the assistance they afforded him.—He has to lament being deprived (by a wound early in the action) of the services of Major-Gen. Riall, who was most unfortunately made prisoner, whilst returning from the field, by a party of the enemy's cavalry, who had a momentary possession of the road. Lieut.-Gen. Drummond has also to regret the wounds which have deprived the corps of the services of Lieut.-Colonel Morrison 89th regiment, and Lieut.-Colonel Robertson of the incorporated militia. In the fall of Lieut. Moorsom of the 104th regiment, serving as Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, the service has lost a gallant, intelligent, and meritorious young officer.—The Lieut.-General and President has great pleasure in dismissing to their homes the whole of the sedentary militia, who have so handsomely come forward on the occasion, confident that on any future emergency, their loyalty will be again equally conspicuous. He will perform a grateful duty in representing to his Majesty's Government, the zeal, bravery, and alacrity with which the militia have co-operated with his Majesty's troops.

(Signed)

J. HARVEY,

Lieut.-Col. and Dep. Adj.-Gen.

Names of Officers Killed, Wounded, and Missing.

OFFICERS KILLED.

General Staff—Lieut. Moorsom, 104th regt. Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General.
1st, or Royal Scots Lieut. Hemhill.
89th Regt. 2d Batt.—Captain Spinner, and Lieut. Latham.
Incorporated Militia—Ensign Campbell.

OFFICERS WOUNDED.

General Staff—Lieut.-General Drummond, severely, not dangerously; Major Gen. Riall, do. and prisoner; Lieut. Colonel Pearson, slightly; Lieut. Le Breton, severely.

Royal Artillery—Captain M'Lachlan, dangerously.

1st, or Royal Scots—Capt. Brereton, slightly; Lieut. Haswell, severely, not dangerously; Lt. D. Fraser, ditto, ditto, missing.

1st Batt. 8th, or King's—Lieutenant Noel and Ensign Swayne, slightly; Ensign M'Donald, severely.

89th Regt.—Lieut. Col. Morrison, Lieuts. Sanderson, Steell, Pearce, Taylor, Lloyd, and Miles, severely, not dangerously; Lieut. Red-

man and Adjutant Hopper, slightly; Lieut. Grey and Ensign Saunders, dangerously.

103d Regt.—Lieut. Langhorne, slightly.

Glengary Light Infantry—Lieut. Kerr, ditto.

Incorporated Militia—Lieut. Col. Robinson, dangerously; Capt. Fraser, severely; Captain Washburn, slightly; Capt. M'Donald, severely, left arm amputated; Lieut. M'Dougall, mortally; Lieut. Ratan and Ensign M'Donald, severely; Lieut. Hamilton, slightly.

2d Lincoln Militia—Adj. Thompson, slightly.

4th Ditto—Capt. H. Nellis and Ensign Kennedy, slightly.

5th Ditto—Major Hatt, severely.

2d York Militia—Major Simons, severely; Capt. M'Kay, slightly; Capt. Rockman, Lieuts. Orfield and Smith, severely.

OFFICERS MISSING.

Royal Engineers—Lieut. Yule.

1st, or Royal Scots—Lieuts. Clyne and Lamont, supposed to be prisoners.

8th, or King's Regt.—Quarter-Master Kirnan.

4th Lincoln Militia—Captain H. Nellis and Quarter-Master Bell.

OFFICERS PRISONERS.

General Staff—Capt. Loring, Aid-de-Camp to Lieut.-Gen. Drummond.

89th Regt.—Capt. Gore.

103d Regt.—Capt. Brown; Lieut. Montgomery and wounded; Ensign Lanie.

Glengary Light Infantry.—Ensign Robin.

Incorporated Militia—Capt. M'Lean; Ensign Wharf; and Quarter-Master Thompson.

Provincial Light Dragoons. Capt. Merritt.

Total Loss, including Officers.—Killed, 84—Wounded, 559—Missing, 193—Prisoners, 42—General Total, 878.

In consequence of the great use made by the enemy of buck shot, many of the wounds have proved slight.

(Signed) EDWARD BAYNES, Adj.-Gen.

Was I not right reader, in calling this a *curious* account? Did you ever before hear, except from the mouths or pens of some of our own commanders, of a *victory* of this sort before? It is a fault, which I always have to point out, in our histories of battles, that we never begin, as the historians of all other countries do, by stating the *strength* of the armies on both sides.—We are left here to guess at the force in the field. We are not told what was even our own strength upon the occasion. If we had been furnished with this information, we should have been able to judge pretty correctly of the nature of the combat, and of the merits of the two armies. When we find that there has been a total loss of 878 men, including a vast proportion of *officers*, we must conclude, that the "*Drubbing*" has not been on the *Americans* only; for the army under General Drummond did not, in all probability, amount to more than *three or four thousand men*! There appears to have been only *four battalions of regulars engaged*, which would hardly surpass 2,000 men. What the militia might have amounted to I cannot tell; but, as far as I am able to judge

from the account, I should suppose that we must have lost, upon this occasion, *one man out of every five*; so that this is a sort of *victory* that is very costly, at any rate.—But, except in victories of this kind, who ever heard before of such numbers of *missing* and *prisoners* on the part of the *victors*? When armies are defeated, they have generally pretty long lists of *missing* and *prisoners*; but, when they gain a victory, and, of course, remain masters of the spot on which the battle has taken place, how odd it is to hear that they have so many people *taken* and *lost*, the latter of whom they can give no account of! And, especially, how odd it is, that so many of these taken and lost persons should be *officers*, and officers of very high rank too! Never, surely, was there before a *victory* attended with circumstances so much resembling the usual circumstances of a *defeat*. The commander *severely wounded*; the second in command *severely wounded*, and made *prisoner* into the bargain; the aide-de-camp to the commander made *prisoner*; several Colonels and Lieutenant-Colonels wounded; a great number of officers and men *missing* and made *prisoners*. If such be the marks of a *victory*, gained over the Americans, I wonder what will be the marks of a *defeat*, if unhappily, we should chance to experience a defeat? At any rate, taking the matter in the most favourable light, what a *bloody* battle this must have been! To be sure, that is a consideration of little weight with the enemies of freedom, who would gladly see half England put to death, if they could thereby have their desire of exterminating freedom in America gratified. But this is not all. The battle has not merely been bloody, but it has afforded a proof of the *determined courage* of the *American army*, and leads us to believe, that, if we persevere, the contest will be *long* as well as bloody; and it is the *length* of the contest that we have to fear. The malignant wise man, who writes in the *Times* newspaper, expresses great sorrow, that the "*heroes of Toulouse*" were not arrived in Canada, previous to the late *victory*. But what could they have done *more* than to render the "*success* of our arms *complete*?" And this, we are told, was the case without their assistance.—The same writer, in the same paper, complains of the Sovereign of Holland for sending an Ambassador to Mr. Madison; and observes, that, if he had waited a *few months*, he might have been spared the

humiliation of sending an embassy to Madison and his set. Hence it would appear, that this wise man gives our fleets and armies but "a few months" to conquer America. It was thus that the same sort of men talked in the memorable times of Burgoyne and Cornwallis. But, in those times, America had not a population of two millions; she had no Government; the greater part of her sea-ports were in our hands: we had a fourth part of the people for us; and the rest were without money, and almost without clothing and arms.—I shall not deny that we may, by the expenditure of two or three hundred millions of money, do the Americans a great deal of mischief. I dare say, that we shall burn some of their towns, and drive some thousands of women and children back from the coast. But, in the mean while, America will be building and sending out ships; she will be gaining experience in the arts and practice of war; she will be pushing on her domestic trade and manufactures; she will be harassing our commerce to death; and *our taxes will be increasing, and annual loans must still be made.*—It is provoking, to be sure; but it really is so; that we must leave the Americans in the enjoyment of their *real* liberty; in the enjoyment of freedom which is *no sham*; must be content to see their country the asylum of all those in Europe who will not brook oppression; we must be content to see America an example to every people, who are impatient under despotism, or..... or (dreadful alternative!) we must be content to pay all our present taxes, and to have new ones added to them!—Nay, after having, for several years, made these new sacrifices in the cause of "regular government, social order, and our holy religion," it may, possibly, happen, at last, that America will remain unhurt; that, having been compelled to learn the art of war, she may become more formidable than ever; and that, in the end, her fleets, in the space of ten years, may dispute with ours that trident, which we now claim as our exclusive property.—Already do we hear persons, who were so eager for giving the "Yankees a hearty drubbing," ask why this is not done. They are already impatient for the conclusion, before the beginning has well taken place. They ask, why the heroes of Thoulouse were not at the late victory. How unreasonable this is! Just as if the Government could convey them in a balloon! Besides, were those heroes to have no time for repose?

Were they to be set on, the moment they had been taken off? The Government, to do it justice, have lost no time. They have sent out men as fast as they could get them ready. But, it requires time to transport men, and guns, and horses, and oats, and hay, and straw, to America; to say nothing about bread, and beef, and pork, and butter, and pease, and rice. Nay, we see, that they have had to send out the timbers for ships, to Canada, where, one would have supposed, there was wood enough, at any rate. If we were to get possession of New York, I should not be at all surprised to hear, that the Ministers were sending fuel thither for the cooking of the men's victuals.—This is very different from what was seen in Portugal, Spain, and France. We shall find no partisans in America; and especially shall we find nobody to take up arms in our cause.—All must go from this country. It is a war of enormous expence; and we must expect to pay that expence. If it come to a close in seven years, I shall think that we have very good luck. The troops who are going out now, and who have been held in readiness to go out for so long a time, will hardly be able to pull a trigger before next June. By that time the Americans will have half a million of men, and FREE men too, in arms; and who is to subdue half a million of men, armed for the defence of their freedom and their homes? How did the people of France, as long as the sound of freedom cheered their hearts, drive back, hunt, and lash their invaders? And, have the Americans less courage, or less activity, than the French? How silly is it, then, to expect to conquer America in "a few months!"—It is a little strange, that the Government have published no *Extraordinary Gazette*, giving an account of the great "victory," of which we have been speaking. They are not, in general, backward in doing justice to our winners of victories.—But it is useless to say much about it. Time will unfold the truth; and, according to all appearance, we shall have time enough to learn all about the events, as well as the effects, of the war against the Republicans of America.—It is strange, that we have no account of the exact numbers of the prisoners that we ourselves have made. If any officers had been taken by us, would they not have been named? And if we have taken no officers, while the Americans have taken so many of ours, what manner of victory is this?

The preceding remarks were written in the country, and sent to press on Wednesday, before I received the following letters on the affairs of America.

BATTLE OF CHIPPAWA.

MR. COBBETT,——We have now for some time been accustomed to accounts of naval conflicts with the Americans, from which we have been able to form a pretty correct idea of what the *seamen* of that nation are capable of doing.—It only remained to have a specimen of the courage of their *soldiers*, to shew that, if we had reason to despair of ever overcoming the navy of the United States, there is as little reason to suppose that we shall succeed in beating their army; or that we shall be able to realise the haughty threat of *recolonising* America, and serving Mr. Madison, as we, arrogantly boast having, served the Emperor Napoleon.—We shall certainly succeed in creating great alarm on the American coast; we may destroy towns, villages, and a deal of property, and compel many, particularly women and children, to fly to the interior for protection. We may even occasion the removal of the seat of Government from Washington.—But, is there any thing more natural than that the peaceable inhabitants of every country should be alarmed, when an enemy actually invades their territory? When we, in this military nation, with our shores encompassed by an invincible navy, and almost every man a soldier, were only threatened with a visit of Napoleon's legions, consternation and alarm pervaded all ranks; measures of precaution were taken, on all hands, to repel the daring intruders, and the removal of the seat of Government, with the property of the nation, to places of greater security, on a landing being effected, were every where spoken of as matters of course.—If we thought we had reason to be afraid, and to adopt these precautions on the mere threat; on the prospect only of an event which might never, and certainly did not, happen, is it very extraordinary that the people of America should have the same feelings, when they find the event actually take place which we scarcely anticipated?—But what were the effects of this alarm in this country? Not surely rebellion and treason against the Government. No idea of that kind was ever entertained.—Every man, on the contrary, was roused to a sense of public danger. All factions

ceased, and those who had been formerly the most violent in their opposition to Ministers, now rallied round them, and were among the foremost to take up arms against the common enemy. This is the effect always produced when the independence of a country is threatened; yet we are gravely told, by the supporters of corruption, that the efforts we are now making to overthrow the American Government; the terror and alarm we are exciting, by burning and destroying every thing we can reach; that these violences, the bare possibility of which produced so great a shew of resistance here, must infallibly bring about a Revolution in America, and lead the people there to join the standard of their invaders! This is what our vile newspaper press is constantly ringing in our ears, and what, I find, has almost become a prevailing opinion in every class of society.—What the general feeling may be when the circumstances attending the Battle of Chippawa are fully known; whether the people will then begin to change their opinion, and be disposed to admit that the Americans may be good patriots, I shall not pretend to say. But this I shall venture to assert, that if the Americans continue, as I have no doubt they will, to display such extraordinary traits of heroism as they did in the late engagement, not all the forces we can send out—no, nor all the hireling troops of other nations, be they what they may, will ever bring America back to its former state of subjugation to this country.

An *Extraordinary Gazette*, and the American official accounts, having now put the public in possession of the details of the battle of Chippawa, I shall, with your permission, make a few remarks on that important and interesting occurrence. Before doing this, however, it may be proper to attend to the accounts which have been published on both sides.—Lieutenant-General Drummond has written a long letter on the subject, which occupies about four pages of the *Gazette*, and is filled chiefly with details as to the previous formation of his troops, and praises of his officers for their gallantry and courage during the action. The following extract contains all that he says as to what took place during the battle:—"I had scarcely completed this formation, when the whole front was warmly and closely engaged. The enemy's principal efforts were directed against our left and centre. After repeated attacks, the troops on the left were

“partially forced back, and the enemy
“gained a momentary possession of the
“road. This gave him, however, no ma-
“terial advantage, as the troops which had
“been forced back formed in the rear of
“the 89th regiment, fronting the road,
“and securing the flank. It was during
“this short interval that Major-General
“Riall, having received a severe wound,
“was intercepted as he was passing to the
“rear, by a party of the enemy’s cavalry,
“and made prisoner. In the centre, the
“repeated and determined attacks of the
“enemy were met by the 89th regiment,
“the detachments of the Royals and King’s,
“and the light company of the 41st regi-
“ment, with the most perfect steadiness
“and intrepid gallantry, and the enemy
“was constantly repulsed with very heavy
“loss. Of so determined a nature were
“these attacks directed against our guns,
“that our artillerymen were bayonnetted
“by the enemy in the act of loading, and
“the muzzles of the enemy’s guns were
“advanced within a few yards of ours.
“The darkness of the night, during this
“extraordinary conflict, occasioned several
“uncommon incidents; our troops having
“for a moment been pushed back, some of
“our guns remained for a few minutes
“in the enemy’s hands; they were, how-
“ever, not only quickly recovered, but the
“two pieces, a six-pounder and a five and
“a half-inch howitzer, which the enemy
“had brought up, were captured by us, to-
“gether with several tumbrils; and in lim-
“bering up our guns at one period, one of
“the enemy’s six pounders was put, by
“mistake, upon a limber of ours, and one
“of our six pounders limbered on one of
“his, by which means the pieces were ex-
“changed; and thus, though we captured
“two of his guns, yet, as he obtained one
“of ours, we have gained only one gun.
“About nine o’clock (the action having
“commenced at six), there was a short in-
“termission of firing, during which it ap-
“pears the enemy was employed in bringing
“up the whole of his remaining force, and
“he shortly after renewed his attack with
“fresh troops, but was every where re-
“pulsed with equal gallantry and success.
“About this period, the remainder of Ma-
“jor-General Riall’s division, which had
“been ordered to retire on the advance of
“the enemy, consisting of the 103d regi-
“ment, under Colonel Scott; the head-
“quarter division of the Royal Scots; the
“head-quarter division of the 8th, or

“King’s; flank companies 104th. Some
“detachments of them under Lieutenant-
“Colonel Hamilton, Inspecting Field-Of-
“ficer, joined the troops engaged, and I
“placed them in a second line, with the
“exception of the Royal Scots, and flank
“companies 104th, with which I prolonged
“my front line on the right, where I was
“apprehensive of the enemy’s outflanking
“me. The enemy’s efforts to carry the
“hill were continued until about midnight,
“when he had suffered so severely from
“the superior steadiness and discipline of
“his Majesty’s troops, that he gave up the
“contest, and retreated with great preci-
“pitation to his camp beyond the Chippa-
“wawa. On the following day he aban-
“doned his camp, threw the greatest part
“of his baggage, camp equipage, and pro-
“visions, into the Rapids; and having set
“fire to Street’s Mills, and destroyed the
“bridge of Chippawa, continued his re-
“treat in great disorder toward Fort Erie.
“My light troops, cavalry, and Indians
“are detached in pursuit, and to harass
“his retreat, which I doubt not he will
“continue until he reaches his own shore.
“The loss sustained by the enemy in this
“severe action, cannot be estimated at less
“than fifteen hundred men, including se-
“veral hundreds of prisoners left in our
“hands: his two commanding Generals,
“Brown and Scott, are said to be wound-
“ed, his whole force, which has never been
“rated at less than five thousand, having
“been engaged. Enclosed I have the ho-
“nour to transmit a return of our loss,
“which has been very considerable. The
“number of troops under my command did
“not for the first three hours exceed six-
“teen hundred men; the addition of the
“troops under Colonel Scott, did not in-
“crease it to more than two thousand eight
“hundred of every description.”

As the enemy’s account of this engage-
ment, contrary to the usual practice of
American writers, is very short, I shall here
give it at full length:—“Copy of a Let-
ter from Capt. L. Austin, Aide to Gen.
Brown, to the Secretary at War, dated—
“Head quarters. Buffalo, 29th July 1814.
“I have the honour of addressing you by
“desire of Gen. Brown, who is now con-
“fined by wounds received in a severe en-
“gagement with the enemy, on the after-
“noon and night of the 25th instant.—Our
“army had fallen back to Chippawa.
“The enemy collecting every regiment
“from Burlington and York, and meeting

"with no opposition on Lake Ontario,
 "transported by water to Fort George,
 "troops from Kingston, and even Prescott,
 "which enabled them to bring against us
 "a force vastly superior, under the com-
 "mand of Lieut.-Gen. Drummond and
 "Major-General Riall. They were met
 "by us near the Falls of Niagara, where a
 "most severe conflict ensued. *The enemy*
 "*disputed the ground with resolution, yet*
 "*were driven from every position they at-*
 "*tempted to hold. We stormed his bat-*
 "*teries directly in front, and took posses-*
 "*sion of all his artillery. Notwithstand-*
 "*ing his immense superiority both in num-*
 "*bers and position, he was completely de-*
 "*feated, and our troops remained on the*
 "*battle ground without any interruption.*
 "As, however, both General Brown and
 "General Scott had received severe
 "wounds, almost every chief of battalion
 "disabled, and our men quite exhausted,
 "it was thought proper to retire to our
 "encampment, which was done in good
 "order, without any molestation from the
 "enemy—our wounded having first been
 "removed. Major General Riall, with
 "the Aide-de-Camp of Lieut.-Gen. Drum-
 "mond, and about 20 other officers, with
 "200 privates, are taken prisoners. The
 "loss on both sides is immense—but no
 "account has yet been returned. The
 "Aide and Brigade Major of Gen. Scott
 "are both severely wounded, and Capt.
 "Spencer, an Aide of Gen. Brown, most
 "probably dead, having received two balls
 "through his body. Both Generals Brown
 "and Scott are on this side confined by
 "their wounds. General Ripley com-
 "mands on the other.—I have the honour
 "to be, very respectfully, Sir, your most
 "obedient servant, L. AUSTIN, Aide-de-
 "Camp.—" P. S. Gen. Brown received his
 "wounds at the same instant during a late
 "part of the action, but still continued to
 "keep his horse until exhausted by loss of
 "blood. This probably has rendered his
 "wounds more painful than they other-
 "wise would have been."

On reading these two accounts of the same
 affair, one is forcibly struck with the *oppo-*
site statements they contain, and which it
 would be a vain task in me to attempt to
 reconcile. We, it is natural, will be in-
 clined to believe our own General, while the
 Americans will as naturally believe theirs.
 The safest way, in my opinion, is to consider
 the affair a *drawn battle*. But whatever
 may be said as to this, there can be no dif-

ference of opinion as to the most important
 feature in it—namely, the *undoubted*
bravery of the Americans, and the little
 hope this affords that the contest will be
 soon terminated.—It is not so clear from
 the enemy's account, who were the assail-
 ants; but General Drummond states, that
 it was the Americans who *commenced* the
 attack in the first instance, and who after-
 wards *renewed* it, after both sides had re-
 ceived reinforcements. This shews that
 the soldiers of the United States are as
 little afraid of us as their sailors. They
 had heard as much about our victories in
 Spain and Portugal as their seamen had
 heard of our naval exploits. Yet, with
 as little experience, they dared to face
 the conquerors, and, notwithstanding our
 troops were long experienced in war, and
 accustomed to triumph, the American sol-
 diers renewed the attack with equal deter-
 mination. "Of so determined a nature,"
 says General Drummond, "were these
 "attacks directed against our guns, that
 "our artillerymen were bayoneted by the
 "enemy in the act of loading, and the
 "muzzles of the enemy's guns were ad-
 "vanced within a few yards of us."—This,
 it will be observed, is not a panegyric of
 their own General, but a compliment paid
 by a British Officer who witnessed "this
 extraordinary conflict," and which, as a
 brave and courageous man, he could not re-
 frain paying even to an enemy. It will
 also be recollected, that the Ameri-
 cans were not, in this instance, fight-
 ing upon their *own* territory. They
 had invaded our possessions, and were
 attacking us upon *our own* ground.
 Consequently they had not the same
 motives for extraordinary exertion they
 would have had, had they been repelling
 invasion, instead of being themselves the
 invaders. Can it be doubted, therefore,
 when they are driven back, *if we are able*
to do it, that they will fight with equal
 courage, when they have their homes and
 their country to protect against foreign
 aggressors? As to what is said about the
superior numbers of the Americans at the
 Battle of Chippawa, I would remark, that
 British valour was formerly held to consist
 in our soldiers beating their foes with an
inferior force. During the last American
 war, we used to boast that *one* Englishman
 could beat *three* Frenchmen at any time,
 though, I confess, I did not hear much of
 this sort of fighting in the late war with
 France. How comes it then, that we did

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not, on this occasion, beat the Americans, when, as admitted by our own General, we had *three* men to their *five*, and that these three, in point of military skill, were superior to the whole American army put together? Without meaning to question the truth of what General Drummond states, I do think there is evidence that the British army, at or near the scene of action, was upwards of four thousand strong, while the enemy were under three thousand.—The Montreal papers of the 23d July, are just before me, in which I find it *officially* stated, that dispatches had been received by General Drummond from Major-General Riall to the 17th instant, at which time, “the Major-General’s collective force amounted to *above four thousand*, with which it was his intention “to take up a position at the Twelve Mile Creek;” and, in the same dispatch, it is added, that “the enemy in the afternoon “of the 15th, advanced a strong column “from Queenston, consisting of about *three thousand* men, with a six-pounder and “howitzer, and approached Fort George, “evidently with the intention of establishing their positions, to enable them to “carry on their operations against this “post.”—In a subsequent dispatch, from General Riall’s head-quarters, at Twelve Mile Creek, dated the 22d July (only three days before the Battle of Chippawa), it is said “the troops were in good spirits, “had daily skirmishes with the enemy, “always to the advantage; bringing in “many prisoners. *The army was about “being joined by the 89th and De Watteville’s regiments.* General Drummond “would arrive on the 24th.”—The engagement took place on the 25th, and, from General Drummond’s letter, it appears that, on his arrival, he “moved with “the 89th, and detachments of the Royal “and King’s, and light company of the “41st, in all about *eight hundred* men, to “join Major-General Riall’s division at “the Falls.”—If we add these eight hundred to the division with General Riall, which, as already noticed, exceeded four thousand, the whole united force under the command of General Drummond, will be found to amount *on the day of the battle*, to at least five thousand men. It is no where said that the Americans had been reinforced since the 15th, when their army was estimated at “about three thousand.”—Had additional troops joined, previous to the 25th, our officers could easily have

ascertained this, for the opposing armies were so close upon each other as to have “daily skirmishes.”—To what then are we to attribute their *silence* respecting a circumstance of such *importance*, and which, in the hourly expectation of a general action, they could not fail to know would have a considerable influence, not only in deciding the contest, but in enabling others afterwards to determine where the greatest merit lay?—If it is said, that our General detached a part of his troops from the main body, and marched them to some other point, I answer, that this is a *gratuitous* way of reasoning. But admitting it, for argument’s sake, I would then say, if the American army had really increased to five thousand, it will be impossible to clear our commanding officer from blame, for exposing our army, in such circumstances, to the risk of being attacked and defeated by a superior force.—But if it is supposed the enemy were *not* reinforced, and had only three thousand men, as originally stated, General Drummond will then stand acquitted for having reduced his force to an equality with his opponents. It is impossible, with the clear evidence arising out of the Montreal official accounts, for me to entertain any other view of the subject; unless, indeed, I give up my judgment altogether, and take the *Courier*, or some such servile and prostituted journal, for my guide.

This brings me to make a few remarks on some statements respecting this subject, which appeared in the *Courier* of Wednesday. It was there said, that the American officer, in the account which he gave of the battle of Chippawa, *admitted* that he had been *defeated*; *attributed* this defeat to the *superiority* of the British army; and that the Americans had, *from the commencement of the action*, 5,000 men engaged. The *first* and *second* assertions, I shall shew to be *false*, by the very document which the *Courier* refers to in order to establish their truth; and the *third* I shall prove to be false, by the statement of General Drummond. It is *not* admitted in the enemy’s account of the battle, that they were *defeated*. On the contrary, that account expressly says:—“Notwithstanding his (General Drummond’s) immense “superiority, both in numbers and position, he (Gen. D.) was *completely* “*defeated*, and our troops remained on the “battle ground without any interruption.” The question here, let it be recollected, is

not whether we or the Americans had the best of the day; but whether the assertion of the *Courier*, that the American General acknowledges he was defeated, is true or false. Instead of acknowledging any such thing, he affirms the contrary, which, on this point at least, destroys the credit of that lying journal. As to the second point, we have the following reasons assigned, in the American dispatch, for the retreat of their army:—"As both General Brown and General Scott had received severe wounds, almost every chief of battalion disabled, and our men quite exhausted, it was thought proper to retire to our encampment." The *Courier* said, that it was pretended by the enemy, they retired in consequence of the superior forces we brought against them. The quotation I have just given, shews this statement to have been as unfounded as the former.—With regard to the last particular, that the Americans, to the amount of five thousand men, were engaged with our troops from the commencement of the action, either the *Courier* has stated what it knew to be false, or we must charge this falsehood to the account of General Drummond. This gallant officer says, that the whole force of the enemy engaged "has never been rated at less than five thousand."—But then he no where states, that this number of men were in action from the beginning. On the contrary, after stating, that the battle commenced at six o'clock, he adds, "About nine there was a short intermission of firing, during which, it appears, the enemy was employed in bringing up the whole of his remaining force, and he shortly after renewed his attack with fresh troops."—Here then is it established, beyond all doubt, that it was only a part of the American army that engaged a part of ours, during the first three hours of the contest. It was not till after a pause in the operations, and after both armies had received an addition of fresh troops, that the action was renewed, in which the whole force of the Americans were brought into the field. The *Courier*, however, challenges the veracity of General Drummond, and, in opposition to the *Gazette*, boldly asserts the fact to be, that the Americans "had more than 5,000 men, whilst we had, for the first three hours, no more than 1600!"—Such is the way in which our vile press sport with truth, and mock the willing dupes of their own credulity.

22d. Sept. 1814.

VERITAS.

AMERICAN NAVY.

MR. COBBETT.—The very clear illustration, which you have so lately given, of the original grounds of the war with the United States of America, and the convincing manner in which you have shewn, that these grounds have ceased to exist, is highly creditable to your talents, and to your character as a public writer. You cannot, however, but be aware, that, in the present state of our corrupt press, little good is to be expected from your patriotic and disinterested exertions. Instead of our writers on the American war meeting the question, as they ought, and as you have so candidly done, they seem to vie with each other in rendering it obscure, and in endeavouring to fix the stigma of the war upon the Americans, which, it is so very plain, can be fixed no where but upon ourselves. Thus, by confounding facts, and bewildering the minds of their readers, they succeed in gaining their approbation of measures, which, were the truth told, they would condemn; and in rousing public indignation against a people who have sprung from the same stock as ourselves, and whom every consideration of policy and justice ought to lead us to respect as brethren. These effects are certainly deplorable; but they are the result of a credulity that seems to be interwoven with the composition of our countrymen, and for which, I am afraid, there is no effectual remedy. Combined with this credulous disposition, there is a strong predilection in the public mind to regard the successes of the enemy, if not defeats, as of no consequence whatever, while every partial advantage we obtain, is magnified into a splendid and glorious victory, and every predatory landing on their coasts, as almost decisive of the fate of the entire continent of America! The *Courier* of Monday last, for example, contains the following insolent gasconade:—"Whilst our army is distinguishing itself by such brilliant successes in Canada, our navy keeps every port in the United States in a state of alarm and confusion. We sail up rivers, take towns, destroy magazines, and advance to within twenty miles of the American capital. This is as it should be. 'We owe it,' as we said on Friday, 'not only to ourselves but to posterity, in the war provoked by America, and engaged in for the most unjust purposes, to make such an impression upon her fears as shall curb her desire of aggrandisement and conquest for many years to

"come."—In this short extract, there are no less than three distinct falsehoods as to the cause of the war with America. It was not provoked by the American Government, but by us. It was not entered into on their part for unjust purposes, but to vindicate the *personal* rights of its citizens. It is not from a desire of aggrandisement and conquest that the Americans prosecute the war, but to resist the attempts now made (after the original grounds of war have ceased to exist) to compel the relinquishment of a portion of territory in our favour, which never before was the subject of contention.—As to our navy keeping the ports of the United States in a state of *alarm and confusion*, I am not disposed to question this. But I have yet to learn that we have either "taken towns or destroyed magazines" belonging to the enemy. At least, if we have done more in this way than holding out *threats*, I should like to have some better evidence of the fact than the statement of the *Courier*. It is true, I recollect something of an attempt, on the part of Sir John Warren, to take possession of Craney Island. But here, if the Americans did not defeat our purpose, they were indebted for their good fortune to the *stupidity* of the planners of the attack, who found it necessary to relinquish it after our troops were in the boats, in consequence of the want of water to carry them in shore—a circumstance as capable of being ascertained *before* as after the attempt. The affair which has just happened near the Falls of Niagara, has all the appearance of a *drawn* contest, in which neither of the parties had any great advantage over the other. When the American account of this battle arrives, it will then be seen how far my opinion is correct. Meanwhile, though the *Courier* seems to be *fully satisfied* with these great and glorious achievements, I perceive that the *Times* newspaper does not feel quite so easy upon the subject. In the leading article of this morning there is the following desponding paragraph:—"We must own that we had hoped, ere this, to have had to record victories obtained in America at a *less expence of blood*. It is not economy in war, it is cruelty, to keep back the force which would render opposition vain. It is a wanton waste of valuable lives, to take the field with an inferior army, when we have it in our power to display an irresistible superiority. From the moment of the treaty of peace, it has

been a matter of *astonishment* to the public in general, what could have prevented the immediate transportation of our victorious troops at once from *Bordeaux to America*.—When this servile tool of a party professes to be so very ignorant, as to the reason why Lord Wellington's army was not immediately shipped off for America, he seems to have forgot all that he so lately said, about the necessity of our keeping up a *large army* in Belgium, in order to support the claims of our dear ally, the Prince of Orange, to that country. It was that measure alone that paralyzed our efforts against the Americans, and until Ministers give up their views as to continental arrangements, or these matters be finally adjusted, it is in vain to expect a vigorous prosecution of the war on the American soil.—But then, we have a *navy*. Yes, a *formidable* navy, consisting of a *thousand* ships of war. A navy, by which we have actually *annihilated* the fleets of France, Holland, Spain and Denmark, and rendered all other European States in a manner *tributary* to our victorious flag. Why does not the *Courier* boast of the mighty things done against the American navy, which is but in its infancy, by so tremendous a force? Why does the *Times* indulge itself in declamations about the distribution of our *army*, when the disposal of our *navy*, and the little it has accomplished against America, presents so wide a field for animadversion? Have our brave tars done enough for glory, that they are now to be laid aside? Or rather, has not the influence and importance of those who conduct the affairs of this essential department of our national defence, been superseded by that of the army? Whichever of these may be the cause of our naval inaction, it is *galling* to think of the numerous losses the country is every day sustaining, through the activity and daring of the Americans. A list of captures, made out from Lloyd's list up to the beginning of this month, makes the number of our vessels taken by the enemy amount to ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY NINE! In the month of August alone, no less than one hundred and five of these were captured. But it is not capturing merely that is the most vexatious and degrading part of the business. The greater part of these vessels have been taken *in sight of our own ports*, by an enemy over whom the *Courier* exults, that "our navy keeps every port in the United States in a state of *alarm and confusion*."

Would it not be *wiser* if that navy, instead of employing itself in *alariming* the old women and children on the coast of America, and burning their houses, were to return home and *protect* our own coasts, and commerce, from an evil ten times more fatal to us than all the injury we can ever do in that predatory warfare? This is not that sort of *glory* to which British tars used to be accustomed. A Nelson and a Cochrane sought out, fought, and vanquished the enemy. We seem to shun the contest; or if we do engage in it, such is the torpid state to which our gallant tars have been reduced, by long neglect and discouragement, that the Americans have almost uniformly been the victors. It has been attempted to ac-

count for these decided advantages, by stating, that the enemy's vessels were larger, and carried more guns than ours.—Formerly, the courage of our seamen used always to consist, in their beating an enemy *superior* both in number and weight of metal.—It is not, however, the fact, that our vessels have *always* been *inferior* in *point of strength* to the Americans. This will appear quite evident from the following statement of the relative strength of the different ships of war, taken by the Americans and by us since the commencement of hostilities, and the number of guns carried at the time by the captors, and the captured:—

The Ships of War taken from us stand thus:—

Vessels Names.	Rate.	Mounted.	By whom taken.	Rate.	Mounted.
Frigate, Java.....	38 guns.....	49	Constellation.....	14 gtns.....	52
— Macedonian.....	38	49	United States.....	44	52
— Guerrier	38	49	Constitution.....	44	52
Sloop of War, Frolic.....	18	24	Wasp.....	18	20
— Peacock.....	18	20	Hornet.....	18	20
— Epervier.....	18	22	Peacock.....	18	22
— Reindeer.....	18	20	Wasp	18	22
— Avon.....	18	20	Ditto.....	18	22
Gun-Brig, Boxer	14	16	Enterprise	14	16
— Dominica.....	10	17	Decatur (Privateer).....	7	7
— Bellaboe.....	8	10	Perry (ditto).....	5	5
Six sail of Vessels on Lake Erie, under the command of Capt. Barclay.....	68		Taken by a Squadron, under the command of Commodore Perry.		

The following Captures made by us:—

Chesapeake.....	36	48	Shannon.....	38	49
Argus.....	16	20	Pelican.....	18	22
Essex.....	32	44	Phoebe.....	36.....49	56
			Olmütz.....	20.....28	56

All the vessels taken by us from America appear, from the above statement, to have carried *fewer* guns than the captors. Several of those taken from us were *superior* in this respect to the Americans who took them; and although those captured by the latter were not all of that description, yet, if we calculate the number of guns actually mounted at the time of engaging by all the vessels put together, it will appear that our ships of war carried in the aggregate 512, while those of the enemy had only 466—making a difference of 46 guns *less* on board the Americans.

The above facts speak volumes:—They shew the shameful and gross imposition of *amusing* the public with accounts of great successes, said to be obtained by our army in America, while an *entire silence* is kept up as to our disasters at sea; they refute the ungenerous and invidious charge brought against the Americans, that they owe their naval victories to the superior number of guns carried by their ships of war; and they overthrow the assertion, which has

been so often made, that our commerce is sufficiently protected by a judicious disposal of our navy. If these facts, relative to our maritime war with America, have become so clear and demonstrable, it will be nothing surprising, considering how much our Rulers occupy themselves with European affairs on the Continent, should our American troops be ultimately compelled to retire from the contest, with equal disgrace and humiliation.—I am, your constant Reader,

NAUTICUS.

Deptford, Sept. 21, 1814.

LORD COCHRANE, AND THE ELECTORS OF WESTMINSTER.

Kirkaldy, Sept. 8, 1814.

In consequence of previous intimation, a considerable number of the well-disposed and respectable Inhabitants of Kirkaldy, assembled at the Wellington Inn here, for the purpose of forming a Congratulatory Address to the Honourable, Free and Independent Electors of Westminster, on their re-election of the Right Honourable

Lord Cochrane; when the following was publicly read and approved of; ordered to be signed by the Chairman, in name of the Meeting, and transmitted by the Secretary to the Honourable Sir Francis Burdett, Baronet:—

WILLIAM DAVIDSON, in the Chair.

GENTLEMEN,—In imitation of the very respectable Inhabitants of Paisley, we now presume to step forward to congratulate you on the laudable and praise-worthy step you have lately taken, in re-electing the Right Honourable Lord Cochrane as one of your Members for Westminster, whom the base time-servers of the day had, through wicked and deceitful means, unwarrantably deprived of his seat in Parliament. Not satisfied with this, his Lordship's enemies pushed matters so far as to obtain a sentence of pillory, fine, and imprisonment, as if he had been a common felon—nay more, deprive him of those laurels he had so magnanimously won, and so justly merited at the hand of his country. His Lordship's firmness and praise-worthy resignation under these uncommon sufferings, we cannot too much admire and respect; and we fondly hope that, notwithstanding all these afflictions, his innocence will soon be confirmed by the exposure of those base intriguers and their intrigues, to the utter confusion of all time-serving placemen and their confederate hirelings. We rejoice that his Lordship possesses laurels more noble and lasting, which it is not in the power of Princes, nor their advisers to bestow, or take away. We also trust, that when his Lordship shall assume his honourable seat, he will be more emboldened than heretofore, in conjunction with your other Honourable Member Sir Francis Burdett, in opposing corruption and its abettors, till the nation, roused from its lethargy, shall unite, in behalf of all those who have been unjustly wronged; and thus will our little happy island outvie, and triumph over all her enemies, both at home and abroad. Gentlemen, we hope and flatter ourselves that you will have no cause to lament the re-election of your Right Honourable Member; we have no doubt his Lordship will be proud of the honour you have done him, as it cannot but attach him more closely to you, and to the interests of the nation. We know that many thousands in Great Britain rejoice at the step you have taken, and the victory ob-

tained by his Lordship, who, nevertheless, are afraid to shew themselves, lest, like some of old, they are put out of the Synagogue. We still hope, however, that the stigma cast on his Lordship's friends, instead of intimidating them, will rather embolden them to come forward, and publicly declare the sense they have of his Lordship's innocence. That the honourable and praise-worthy Electors of Westminster may prosper, and succeed in all their laudable undertakings, and long enjoy the distinguished services of their able and truly honourable representatives; and when they shall have done their duty in their day and generation, that others, in succession, may fill their place who shall equal them in abilities and fortitude, is the ardent wish of this Meeting.

Signed by appointment,
WILLIAM DAVIDSON, Chairman.

CORRUPTION.

SIR.—I do not think that a word, in the whole circle of our language, could be found to designate more aptly, and with greater effect, the system presently acted upon in this country than the word *Corruption*. Dr. Johnson says that it signifies *wickedness; perversion of principles; the means by which any thing is vitiated; depravation*.—I was lately reading the Discourses of Algernon Sidney, concerning Government, in which I found the following passage, that struck me very forcibly as applicable to the present times, and as greatly tending to illustrate the meaning Dr. Johnson has affixed to this word.—Some of your readers may, perhaps, be able also to discover the resemblance:—“Caesar set up his tyranny by spreading corruption farther than others had been able to do; and though he, Caligula, and some others, were slain, yet the best men found it as impossible to restore liberty to the city when it was corrupted, as the worst had done to set up a tyranny whilst the integrity of their manners did continue. Men have a propensity to run into all manner of excesses, when plenty of means invite; of which the succeeding Emperors took advantage, and knowing that even their subsistence depended upon it, they thought themselves obliged by interest, as well as inclination, to make honours and preferments the rewards of vice; and though it be not always true in the utmost extent, that all men follow the example of the King, yet it is of very great efficacy.

False witnesses and accusers had a better trade under Tiberius than under Trajan, who abhorred them; and whores, fidlers, with other such vermin, abounded certainly more when encouraged by Nero, than when despised by Antoninus and Marcus Aurelius. All tyrannies have had their beginnings from corruption: the histories of Greece, Sicily, and Italy, shew that all those who made themselves tyrants did it by the help of the worst, and the slaughter of the best: men could not be made subservient to their lusts whilst they continued in their integrity; so their business was to destroy those who could not be corrupted; they must therefore endeavour to maintain the corruption by which they attain to their greatness. 'Tis not easy to name a Monarch that had so many good qualities as Julius Caesar, till they were extinguished by his ambition; he knew that his strength lay in the corruption of the people, and that he could not accomplish his designs without increasing it: he did not seek good men, but such as would be for him; and thought none sufficiently addicted to his interests, but such as stuck at the performance of no wickedness that he commanded: having spread his poison among the soldiers, his next work was by corrupting the Tribunes to turn their power to the destruction of the people, which had been erected for their preservation."—Yours, &c. DION.

SPANISH AFFAIRS.—In Europe and in South America the affairs of Spain are every day assuming an aspect more consoling than they have of late, because they are more favourable to liberty. The last accounts from Buenos Ayres convey the agreeable intelligence of the surrender of Monte Video, the last strong hold, in that quarter, of Spanish despotism. "The fall of Monte Video," says the writer of these accounts, "is considered as a death blow to the monarchical system in this part of the world."—In the mother country, oppression still rears its head, but measures are pursuing of a nature so obnoxious, that the disaffected must, ere long, become sufficiently formidable to overawe their oppressors.—Almost every where the people are ready to proceed to extremities, and to repay, with usury, the wrongs they are suffering by the re-establishment of political and spiritual tyranny. The country is in a

manner hermetically sealed, for the purpose of preventing intelligence of its real situation transpiring. But this does not always prevent the truth from coming out. From Cadiz a proclamation, and general order, has been received, issued by the Captain General of that province on the 28th ult. which sufficiently developes the agitated state of the public mind. He complains of "the seditious conduct of some individuals;" he talks of "traitors and disturbers of the public repose who continue to mislead the people"; he says that "these offences can no longer remain unpunished;" that "justice shall in future be executed with the celerity it demands;" that a *military* tribunal will be established to decide *within three days*; and that every one is to be brought before it, who may be "accused of having directly or indirectly spoken against the Sovereignty of Ferdinand VII."—When a Government finds it necessary to resort to measures of this description, in order to *compel* a people to be *loyal*, it is very plain that its power is fast verging to a close. But the most extraordinary part of this Spanish Captain's proclamation is that which respects the other Sovereigns of Europe.—After stating that every Spaniard "ought implicitly to obey the orders of the Monarch," he assigns as a reason for this, that these orders have been "recognised by the Powers of Europe."—He also asserts, that Ferdinand owes his restoration to the thrones of Spain and the Indies to "the valour and fidelity of his subjects and armies." I question much whether any of the Powers of Europe (unless indeed we except the Pope) have given a direct sanction to the measures of which the people complain. But although they had; although all the world had recommended the re-establishment of the Inquisition, and the uncontrollable domination of the priesthood, it was the duty of the King to reject this; and to shew, by the establishment of good laws, that he consulted the happiness of a people, to whom, he admits, he is indebted for his crown.—In giving them up to the savage controul of a barbarous and brutish clergy, he puts the seal upon his own ingratitude, and relieves his subjects from all obedience to his orders and decrees.